We document a relationship between income inequality and variability in aggregate consumption growth. In high-income countries, greater income inequality is associated with more volatility in consumption growth, whereas in lower-income countries, higher levels of income inequality are associated with less volatility. We present weaker evidence that variability in real GDP growth is also related to income inequality in the same way. Our results suggest that the level of¯nanical development may help to explain why the distribution of income a®ects the short-run variability of consumption and output di®erently in high-income countries than in low-income countries.
Introduction
Changes in the income distribution in the United States as well as other industrialized countries since the late-1970s have drawn considerable attention both in the popular press and in the academic literature. While newspaper accounts have focused on the political rami¯cations of growing inequality, the academic literature has taken up two issues.
First, there is an active debate regarding the underlying source of the inequality, and, second, an intensifying debate about the long-run consequences of income inequality.
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This paper is an attempt to examine whether inequality is associated with the short-run volatility of consumption and output growth as well.
Using cross-country panel data, we demonstrate that greater income inequality is associated with less consumption and output variability in the subsequent period when per capita income is low. When per capita income is high, however, greater income inequality is followed by more consumption and output variability. As a preliminary step in explaining our¯nding, we also explore the relationship between macroeconomic°u ctuations, income inequality and¯nancial development. Our results suggest that nancial development and availability of credit{both of which are generally associated with higher levels of per capita income{may help to explain why the distribution of income a®ects the short-run variability of consumption and output di®erently in highincome countries than in low-income ones.
This paper is related to recent work that has examined the e®ect of income inequality on economic performance in the long-run. Theoretical studies such as Galor and Zeira (1993) , Benabou (1996) , and Durlauf (1994) have shown how the distribution of income can a®ect long-run growth through its e®ect on the accumulation of human capital. These studies have been complemented by Persson and Tabellini (1994) who show empirically that inequality is harmful for growth in democracies and suggest that income distribution a®ects voting outcomes, with more unequal distributions resulting in more growth-reducing redistributive policies. In addition, Perotti (1996) provides some empirical evidence that restricted access to credit by the poor, political instability, and the education/fertility decision are potential channels through which income distribution a®ects long-run growth. More recently, Partridge (1997) and Forbes (2000) have also added to this debate. Using data from the U.S. states, Partridge obtains di®erent results about the relationship between inequality and growth for di®erent measures of income inequality. Forbes employs the same panel data on income inequality we utilize below to challenge the view that income inequality has a negative e®ect on economic growth.
Our paper is closely related to Krussell & Smith (1998) , who show that macroeconomic behavior can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution. In their model, however, all individuals face the same borrowing constraint. In this paper we argue that all individuals do not face the same borrowing constraints{access to credit depends on wealth (in our model, human capital wealth).
Therefore, when credit constrained and unconstrained individuals have di®erent consumption smoothing abilities, the distribution of wealth does a®ect aggregate volatility.
Furthermore, when income depends on wealth, we also observe a relationship between income distribution and macroeconomic activity. 2
Because we link the distribution of income to aggregate°uctuations in consumption and output, our work is also related to Deaton and Paxson (1994) . In it, the authors show that the cross-sectional variation in consumption increases with age and argue that this evidence is consistent with the permanent income hypothesis. While we examine a slightly di®erent phenomena{the variation in aggregate consumption growth in several countries across time{our conclusions might also be consistent with the permanent income hypothesis if the distribution of income determines the fraction of the population who have the ability to smooth consumption in the face of adverse shocks. Low-income individuals may smooth their consumption to a lesser degree than high-income individuals if the former are bound by liquidity constraints while the latter are not. Zeldes (1989) provides some evidence that the consumption behavior of less wealthy individuals is bound by borrowing constraints. Of course, the consumption variability of borrowing 2 In Krussell and Smith's model, the marginal propensity to save is largely independent of wealth, which allows them to generate their aggregation results. However, some of the very poorest agents do have lower marginal propensities to save, however, since they are very poor in relative terms, they do not substantially in°uence the aggregate. An alternative interpretation of our empirical results is that income distribution is an indicator of the relative importance of the very poor. In particular, in low income countries, an equal distribution of income implies that the very poor have greater in°uence on aggregate behavior; but in high income countries equal income distribution implies just the opposite.
constrained individuals may be reduced by precautionary savings.
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When credit constraints bind lower income individuals, an increase in inequality may have di®ering e®ects in low-and high-income countries. If only relatively highincome individuals have access to credit, a more unequal income distribution in a lowincome country would imply that a larger fraction of individuals can smooth consumption, and therefore that aggregate consumption would be smoother. Reinforcing this e®ect on aggregate outcomes is the fact that, when the income distribution is unequal, high-income families account for a large share of aggregate consumption and, therefore, their ability to smooth consumption would have a disproportionate e®ect on aggregate°u ctuations. On the other hand, if middle-as well as high-income individuals had access to credit, as might be the case in a high-income country, a more unequal income distribution could imply that a smaller percentage of the population would be able to smooth consumption. This would generate a positive relationship between inequality and consumption in high-income countries.
In the¯nal section of our paper we o®er some preliminary evidence that is consistent with the idea that the development of¯nancial markets may improve the consumption smoothing abilities of individuals in the middle and lower tail of the income distribution. Speci¯cally, we show that in economies with less developed¯nancial markets, more inequality leads to smaller°uctuations, possibly because higher levels of inequality in less nancially developed economies generate more unconstrained consumption smoothers.
For those countries that are the most¯nancially developed, higher inequality leads to more°uctuations. Das (1993) also takes up a similar question to the one we pursue here. Using time series data from the United States, he concludes that greater inequality is associated with more macroeconomic°uctuations. Our use of cross-country panel data, however, allows us to reach a more general conclusion about how income inequality is related to macroeconomic°uctuations because we are able to analyze this e®ect in both high-and low-income countries.
Our investigation of the e®ects of income distribution on macroeconomic°uctu-ations are presented in the next four sections. Section 2 lays out our basic theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses our estimation and data selection strategy. Section 4 presents our main results, discusses the robustness of these results to changes in our estimation and data selection strategy, and provides some discussion of their interpretation.
Section 5 concludes.
The Framework

Production
Our basic setup is a variant of that proposed in Freeman (1996) . We model a small open economy in which a single good is produced with physical and human capital using a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology,
where Y t is aggregate output, K t is the physical capital stock, and H t is the aggregate human capital stock, which is the sum of all individuals' human capital used in production. Suppose that the world interest rate is constant at ¹ r: Because there is perfect capital mobility, the interest rate in the small open economy is equal to ¹ r as well. Given that the production function exhibits CRS, it is straightforward to show that K t =H t and @Y =@H t´FH are also constant. Thus, factor payments are given by the following:
Individuals
Individuals live for two periods in overlapping generations and obtain utility from consuming in each period,
where ±; 0 · ± · 1, is the time discount factor, u(:) is homothetic and satis¯es the standard Inada conditions.
When young, individuals inherit the human capital level of their parents for work in the¯rst period, and invest time in enhancing their human capital for second period work. They also consume and save (or dissave) in the¯rst period. In the second period, individuals work, consume, have children, and repay any loans. For simplicity, we assume that childrearing does not consume any time or other parental resources, and that there is no population growth.
The amount of human capital that an individual is able to accumulate depends on the amount of time spent in school in the¯rst period and the level of the parent's human capital. Speci¯cally, an individual born at time t has human capital in the second period equal to
where e i t = 1 + x i t and x i t is the amount of time spent accumulating human capital. The speci¯cation in (4) implies that children whose parents have lower levels of human capital require more study time to generate the same level of human capital as a child with higher human capital parents.
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At the beginning of the¯rst period, individuals choose how much time to spend in school, x i t , how much time to spending working,`i t , and decide how much to save{or if they are not subject to credit constraints, borrow{in the¯rst period by maximizing
subject to x i t +`i t · 1; 0 · x i t · 1, and 0 ·`i t · 1:
Without Borrowing Constraints
As a benchmark, we¯rst discuss the solution to this problem when no one is subject to credit constraints. Then, the¯rst-order conditions are given by
and
where the inequality signs in (7) arise when the constraint 0 · x i t · 1 is binding. These conditions give rise to three di®erent kinds of choices for x i t . Speci¯cally,
Thus, as in Freeman, the children of the parents with lowest human capital levels spend more time studying. For these children, the marginal return to schooling is highest, and because they can borrow to¯nance¯rst period consumption, will spend all their time in school. At higher levels of parental human capital, the marginal return to schooling is lower, and individuals spend time in school only until the return to schooling equals the world interest rate, ¹ r. Finaly, for children who have parents with very high levels of human capital, the marginal return to schooling may be less than the world interest rate and these children spend no time investing further in human capital.
Note also that, since (6) satis¯ed for all individuals, aggregate consumption volatility across the two periods will be a function of the discount factor, ±, and the world interest rate, ¹ r, only. Put di®erently, given that there exists no borrowing constraints, there will be perfect intertemporal consumption smoothing in this economy. 5
With Borrowing Constraints
Now suppose that lenders in this economy operate selectively in providing individuals credit and lend only to individuals with high earnings potential. This assumption can be motivated in a variety of ways and, as discussed in the introduction, is consistent with the empirical observation that low-income individuals have restricted access to credit.
For heuristic purposes leth;h = h ¤ ; denote the threshold level of human capital under which credit to potential borrowers is not available. 6 Suppose thath > h i t for some i so that individuals with parental human capital levels less thanh are constrained. For these individuals, the¯rst-order conditions change slightly for two reasons: First, they would like to shift some of their second period income into the¯rst period at the existing world interest rate, ¹ r. Second, x i t · 1 no longer binds because, for individuals who canot borrow, choosing x i t = 1 would yield no consumption in the¯rst period. Thus, thē rst-order conditions for these individuals become
It is straightforward to show that borrowing-constrained individuals choose study time that is less than or equal to the study time of unconstrained individuals.
5 In fact, if the gross world interest rate, ¹ r, equals one and there is no time discounting so that ± equals one as well, then, 8i, c
, and the variance of lifetime consumption would equal zero. 6 Given this speci¯cation, the threshold level of income for access to credit is constant across countries, and it is independent of the level of potential per capita income. This simpli¯cation might be misleading, especially if an individual's access to credit depends on his relative earnings potential. However,¯nancial depth and development are positively related [See King and Levine (1993) ]. While this does not guarantee thath is identical across countries as we assume, it does suggest that an increase in mean income, ceteris paribus, increases the availability of¯nancial resources and the access to credit.
Importantly, though, the inequality introduced in the¯rst condition in (9) now adds an additional source of consumption variability. Children of low-human-capital parents would like to devote all their time endowment in the¯rst period to schooling and would like to borrow to¯nance their¯rst-period consumption but they cannot, and thus must reduce their consumption in the¯rst period below the desired level. Therefore, the larger the fraction of the population that is credit constrained is, the greater the aggregate variability in consumption. 
Let g t (h
Given that the utility function u(:) is homothetic, unconstrained individuals choose to allocate a constant fraction of their total income to consumption in the¯rst period regardless of their income. In contrast, credit constrained individuals consume less than their desired level when young and, as a result, exhibit steeper lifetime consumption growth. Thus, we can rewrite (11) as
where ·; · > 0, denotes the optimal ratio of second period consumption to¯rst pe-
The speci¯cation in (12) inidcates that whether a greater degree of income inequality leads to a higher or lower variance of consumption depends on the distribution of parental human capital levels{as summarized by the c.d.f. G t (h i t ). To examine how higher income inequality might a®ect variations in aggregate consumption demand, consider a mean-preserving spread in the distribution G t (h i t ). If the average parental human capital stock is relatively low such that, at time t; G t (h ¤ ) > 1=2, a majority of individuals are denied credit as their earnings potential is relatively low.
; and the proportion of the population that has access to credit will be higher with greater inequality. In this case, an increase in income inequality unambiguously leads to a lower variance of consumption demand as
Now consider the case in which the average parental human capital stock is relatively high such that, at time t; G t (h ¤ ) · 1=2, and a majority of individuals have access to credit because their earnings potential is high. In this case, an increase in income inequality will lead to a greater variance of consumption demand beacause, when
In sum, taken together equations (12)- (14) demonstrate the impact of credit constraints on aggregate consumption demand, and how income inequality and aggregate consumption demand may be related. When only the lower classes are credit-constrained, greater inequality (a smaller middle class) leads to more°uctuations in aggregate consumption. When both the lower and middle classes are constrained, however, greater inequality may lead to less°uctuations in consumption. If a country's per capita income is an indication of whether or not the middle-class is constrained, then income inequality and per capita income should be a \good" summary measure of the fraction of the population that is unable to smooth consumption. In poorer countries, both the lower and middle classes are likely to be constrained, whereas in richer countries only the lower class may be constrained. Thus, in low income countries greater inequality may translate into less°uctuations in aggregate consumption, and in higher income countries greater inequality may result in more°uctuations.
The simple framework outlined above shows the link between income distribution and aggregate demand°uctuations, but an enhanced model with nominal or real rigidities (that help generate an upward sloping short-run aggregate supply curve) would also imply a similar relationship between the income distribution and real output°uctuations.
Although we do not develop such a model here, in the next section we present{in addition to the consumption/inequality relationship outlined above{some empirical evidence on this relationship.
Estimation Strategy and Data
There are several important issues that we encounter in attempting to uncover the empirical relationship between income inequality and°uctuations in aggregate output or consumption. One of these issues is that institutional/cultural features of the economy that could be correlated with income inequality may also in°uence the variability of output or consumption. For example, a central bank's willingness to accommodate adverse shocks may di®er across countries, or perhaps, some countries may have more extensive automatic stabilizers and a greater commitment to providing a social safety net. These institutional/cultural factors could be correlated with income inequality, particularly in democracies where voting behavior can in°uence government policy. 7 Fortunately, panel data is available, and we are able to address this issue by estimating a¯xed-e®ects model.
A second issue that plagues our investigation is the fact that it is di±cult to disentangle the e®ect of inequality on output or consumption variation from the e®ect of these°uctuations on inequality. If higher output variability creates greater inequality, one might expect to¯nd a positive correlation between income inequality and macroeconomic°uctuations even if inequality had no e®ect on the severity of business cycles.
We attempt to address this issue in two ways. First, to focus attention on the link from inequality to aggregate°uctuations, we use a lagged value of inequality, studying the relationship between initial income inequality and subsequent aggregate consumption and output variability. Second, as we explain below, we measure consumption and output 7 See Persson and Tabellini (1994) .
variation over a fairly long period of time, increasing the likelihood that we observe both contractions and expansions during this time period. If one believed that expansions exacerbated inequality and recessions reduced it (or vice versa), our methodology should somewhat mitigate the concern that our results are caused by the link from output variability to inequality because our variability measures should capture both expansions and recessions. Nonetheless, neither of our proposed solutions solve this endogeneity problem entirely, and we remain cautious in our interpretation.
A third issue that needs to be addressed at the outset is the limitations put on us by the availability of data. As we will argue below, it is crucial that we not only implement a panel estimation but that we measure output and consumption variability over a su±ciently long time period. Thus, the data requirements of our task are substantial, but income inequality data sets are notoriously sparse and often of dubious quality.
While our ability to expand our data set is limited, we are able to exclude the poorest quality inequality measures by using only the inequality measures that have received an \accepted" rating from Deininger and Squire (1996) . 8 We also recognize that our relatively small sample size makes our analysis sensitive to outliers and therefore we conduct several tests for robustness of our results.
Finally, our approach must also recognize that income inequality may have di®erent economic signi¯cance at di®erent stages of development. More speci¯cally, if individuals' behavior during periods of recessions and expansions can di®er by income, the e®ect of inequality may also vary with the level of per capita income. For this reason, we allow the e®ect of inequality to vary with the latter.
Any e®ect of household income inequality is likely to manifest itself,¯rst and foremost, in the component of aggregate economic activity that is engaged in by households:
aggregate consumption. In addition, if there are any nominal rigidities in the economy,°u ctuations in aggregate consumption will create variation in output. Therefore, we focus our analysis on the e®ect of inequality on consumption and output variability.
After considering the issues discussed above, our empirical estimates of the e®ect of in-come inequality on macroeconomic°uctuations are obtained by estimating the following equation with panel data.
where V i;t is the variation of real consumption or output growth at time t for country i, ¹ i is a country-speci¯c e®ect,¸t is a time speci¯c e®ect, I NCINEQ t¡1 is a measure of income inequality in the preceding period, M EANGDP t¡1 is the average level of real per capita income in the preceding period, and X t are additional control variables that may help to explain output°uctuations and À i;t is the variability in consumption or output not explained by the regressors. 9 We assume that À i;t is uncorrelated with the regressors and is distributed normally with a mean of zero and a variance of ¾ 2 i;t .
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The control variables in X t include the average growth rate of real per capita income or consumption over the period, GROW T H t , M EANGDP t¡1 , the mean of in-°a tion over the period, INF MEAN, and the standard deviation of in°ation over the period, INF ST DEV . GROW T H is included because the standard deviation of growth rates may be correlated with the average growth rate, based purely on the manner in which standard deviation is constructed. MEANGDP is included to isolate its e®ect independent of its interaction with income inequality. Finally, we include the in°ation mean and standard deviation because they will be correlated with output growth variability when the aggregate supply curve is upward sloping.
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A natural choice for our empirical measure of output and consumption variability, V i;t , is the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita and of 9 We measure both MEAN GDP and IN CIN EQ at the same time because both are measures of the income distribution. Our conclusions are not materially a®ected if we measure MEAN GDP at time t.
10 In addition to adopting this assumption on the distribution of errors because of its intuitive appeal for cross-country data, we also con¯rmed it with a Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity.
11 For a recent survey of the vast literature on the output and in°ation tradeo®, see Erceg, Henderson and Levin (forthcoming).
real consumption per capita. In order to calculate such a measure, however, we need to collapse several years of data into one time period.
When determining our data selection strategy, we also need to consider the fact that income inequality measures for most countries change very slowly. It is important to allow su±cient time between observations of the inequality measure so that we can observe signi¯cant changes in the income distribution. Thus, we face a tradeo® in constructing our data set: A larger number of years between observations allows us to examine more meaningful changes in the income distribution and calculate consumption and output variability over a longer time period, but at the same time, it also reduces the number of time periods we include in our regression, reducing the e±ciency of our¯xed e®ects estimation. With these tradeo®s in mind, we initially examine a two-period¯xed e®ects model. Later, we consider a three-period model. during a three year period and then observe the variation of GDP or consumption growth over the subsequent 9 years.
14 Using this methodology, we are able to include 14 countries in our panel. By relaxing our criteria slightly and including observations that have an income inequality measure taken between 1967 and 1973 and between 1979 and 1985, we are able to almost double our sample to include 27 countries. We report results for both the restricted (14-12 Given the constraints put on us by the sparsity of panel data on income inequality, one might be tempted to estimate (15) with a random e®ects speci¯cation. We do not pursue this option, however, because the country-speci¯c e®ects are correlated with our regressors, thus rendering a random e®ects approach inconsistent. (A Hausman test rejects the random e®ects model with a p-value of less than .05 in seven of the eight speci¯cations in Table 2.) 13 While some countries in our sample have data available outside the time period 1969 to 1992, we chose this time period because it allows us to maximize the number of countries in our estimation. Later, we consider an exercise in which we extend the time period our panel covers prior to 1969 for a smaller number of countries.
14 When we have more than one observation of inequality for a particular country over the three year period, we averaged the multiple observations to obtain a single estimate. This data selection strategy is defensible on the grounds that economy-wide measures of income inequality change very little on a year-over-year basis. and Q(5) imply higher inequality, higher shares of income of the middle class imply lower inequality. Therefore, to convert our measures of the middle class income share to measures of inequality, we subtract them from 100 and denote them as Q(3; 4) and Q(2; 3; 4), where Q(3; 4) is 100 minus the share of the third and fourth quintiles, and Q(2; 3; 4) is 100 minus the share of the second, third, and fourth quintiles. Table 1 presents summary statistics from our full sample. While the sample contains both low-and high-income countries, it is important to note that, due to the lack of reliable income inequality data especially for low-income countries, our sample has a limited representation of such countries, making the average level of per capita income rather high (measured in 1985 dollars over the periods 1972-1980 and 1984-1992) and urging caution in interpreting our results for very low-income countries.
15 Table 1 also shows that our four measures of inequality are highly but not perfectly correlated, indicating that each measure captures a slightly di®erent aspect of the income distribution.
A¯nal point to note from Table 1 is that the unconditional correlation between inequality and°uctuations in consumption and output growth is fairly low. This emphasizes the fact that the partial correlations we identify with our panel regressions are conditional on our control variables. In addition, our¯xed-e®ects estimations identify a within-country relationship between inequality and°uctuations and not a relationship 15 The countries in our full sample are: Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad, U.K., U.S.A., and Venezuela. across countries.
[ 
Initial Estimates
Since the most direct link between household income inequality and aggregate°uctua-tions is likely to be through variation in consumption, we¯rst estimate equation (15) using the variation of consumption growth. The results for the full and restricted sample appear in Tables 2 and 3. In both tables, the¯rst four columns present the results for the four di®erent inequality measures without controlling for the in°ation mean and standard deviation, while the last four columns show results that include these in°ation measures. The results for both samples are qualitatively similar and we discuss here only the full sample results in Table 2 . Using any of the four measures of income inequality, these results are consistent with the idea that income distribution and aggregate consumption°uctu-ations are closely related. This relationship, however, changes with per capita income.
Greater inequality at the beginning of a period is associated with less variability in consumption growth over the subsequent 9 years in economies with low per capita income.
However, when per capita income is higher, this e®ect is reversed and greater inequality is associated with higher aggregate consumption variability. The coe±cients estimated in Table 2 indicate that the level of per capita income at which the turning point occurs is about $9,500 (in 1985 dollars). About a third of our sample is above this turning point.
[ Tables 2 and 3 about here.] As stated earlier, in the presence of some real or nominal rigidities, it is likely that variations in aggregate consumption demand will be correlated with°uctuations in real output. Tables 4 and 5 give results from repeating the preceding exercise using the standard deviation of real per capita GDP growth as the dependent variable. These results are consistent with those presented in Tables 2 and 3 , although one of our inequality measures, Q(3; 4), does not produce signi¯cant coe±cients. It is also worthwhile to note that in Tables 2 through 5 , the coe±cient on M EANGDP , though not statistically signi¯cant in a few regressions, suggests that high-income countries have less variation in output and consumption. The microeconomic corollary to this¯nding is that individuals with higher incomes are better able to smooth consumption.
[Tables 4 and 5 about here.]
Sensitivity Analysis
As discussed above, the relatively small size of our data set makes our analysis sensitive to outliers and it is necessary to con¯rm the robustness of the results above. We undertook several exercises to this end.
First, we are concerned that our results might be heavily in°uenced by an individual country in our data set. To evaluate the e®ects of making small changes in our sample, we estimated equation (15) twenty-seven di®erent times, each time dropping one country (two observations) from the sample.
16 Although we do not report the results for all of these regressions here, we do¯nd that this exercise shows our results to be robust to removing individual countries from our sample. There was only one case in which the coe±cient on an inequality measure (Q(3; 4)) in the consumption regressions did not always retain a 5 percent signi¯cance level. Overall, our GDP results were not quite as strong: the interaction term for Q(2; 3; 4) retained the right sign but was not always statistically signi¯cant and the p-value for the coe±cient on GI NI dropped just below 10 percent in one speci¯cation. All in all, however, these results indicate that our initial conclusions are not the results of one unique country pulling our regression coe±cients into signi¯cance. In particular, the two inequality measures that are most closely related to how rich the rich are, Q(5) and GINI, perform the best.
In addition to performing this ad hoc sensitivity analysis, we also employ a robust regression technique that eliminates outliers (observations for which Cook's D >1) and 16 We actually estimated each equation 54 di®erent times (27 times with the in°ation variables in and 27 times without the in°ation variables) for each of the four inequality measures.
iteratively selects weights for the remaining observations to reduce the absolute value of the residuals. 17 The results of this exercise for the full sample are in Tables 6 and 7. These results are generally consistent with those found above: The consumption results are robust to the change in the estimation procedure but the results for GDP are only robust for the inequality measures that capture the position of the upper class, Q(5);
and to a lesser extent, GI NI. Thus, this exercise leaves us feeling con¯dent about the consumption results and the GDP results for Q(5) and GINI; but less con¯dent about the GDP results with our middle class measure, Q(3; 4) and Q(2; 3; 4).
[Tables 6 and 7 about here.]
We also examined our¯ndings in a third way by splitting our sample into highincome and low-income countries and somewhat relaxing the structure imposed by equation (15) by estimating it without the interaction term, I NCINEQ ¤ M EANGDP , for each of the two groups. Our initial results suggest that in these two split samples, the coe±cient on INCINEQ should be negative in the low-income sample and positive in the high-income sample. Of course, as mentioned above, the coe±cients in Tables 2 and   4 indicate that \poor" countries are those with per capita income levels below $9,500. Thus, our \poor" country sample contains about 2/3 of the entire sample and includes many middle-income countries. The results from this test, presented in Tables 8a-b and 9a-b, con¯rm the full sample results. We obtain negative and signi¯cant coe±cients on all four income inequality measures in our low-and middle-income sample, and positive coe±cients on all four income inequality measures in our high-income sample. If there is a structural shift across the two time periods in our sample, then the pooling required for our¯xed e®ects estimation may result in biased coe±cients. With only two time periods, it is di±cult to perform a formal test for structural change, but we are able to re-estimate equation (15) under two di®erent assumptions to determine how signi¯cant an impact potential structural change might have on our major conclusions.
First, we estimated the regressions in tables 2 and 4 without time dummies to see if our coe±cients changed signi¯cantly. Although we do not report the results here, we did not¯nd that excluding time dummies changed the nature of the results already reported. In addition, we also re-estimated (15) using slightly di®erent time periods to measure variation in output and consumption by shifting our current measurement period both forward and backward two years. We found that the results in our consumption regressions (Table 2) were not sensitive to this change but our GDP results were a®ected.
In particular, when we shifted the measurement of GDP variation back two periods, we were not able to retain signi¯cance of the estimated coe±cients on inequality.
19 We do not, however, pursue the estimation of a time-varying coe±cients model due to the limitations put on us by the size of our data set.
Finally, we attempted to determine how robust our results were to di®erent sample selection strategies. As we mentioned above, our methodology requires a very long panel so that we can calculate standard deviations of aggregate variables over a su±ciently long time period and observe di®erences in a very slowly moving variable, income inequality.
Unfortunately, applying our criteria to the available data resulted in identifying only two time periods for our estimation, a less than ideal data set for implementing a¯xed e®ects estimation. By relaxing our criteria somewhat, we are, however, able to slice our data in a third way, generating a slightly smaller panel of 24 countries and 3 time periods. To do this, we reduce the time period between inequality observations and observe inequality measures in periods 1968 to 1970, 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to 1986 and we calculate the standard deviation of output and consumption growth between 1968 and 1976, 1977 and 1984 and 1985 and 1992 . This new data set di®ers from our original two in that the change in inequality measures between time periods is smaller and there is 19 As we describe below, we were also able to produce an additional extended sample of eight relatively high-income countries in order to add a third time period to our sample. The addition of the third time period allows us to perform a Chow predictive test for structural change on this smaller sample. Consistent with the¯ndings we state above, these tests indicated that we could reject the hypothesis of stability across the time periods in our extended sample for the variation in real GDP growth, but not for the variation in consumption growth.
complete overlap between inequality observations and the period over which we calculate consumption and output variability.
Thus, in this third data set, the observed change in the income distribution may be less economically meaningful. In addition, endogeneity may be even more of a problem. If business cycle°uctuations create inequality, our overlapping of inequality and variability measures and the shorter time period over which we measure variability may subject the results to an even more problematic interpretation.
Results of the consumption variability estimation using our third sample appear in Table 10 . As can be seen in this table, our results regarding the relationship between the variability of consumption growth and inequality are generally preserved. Three of the four inequality measures and their interaction terms retain the signs and signi¯cance of our original results. In addition, although they are not statistically signi¯cant, the signs on the coe±cients in the GINI regression are consistent with our previous results.
[ Table 10 about here.]
Our results using output growth variation cannot be replicated with this sample, however. Our estimation of equation (15) using output growth variability with this third sample did not yield signi¯cant coe±cients on our income distribution variables and we do not report these results here. Thus, while a link between consumption variability and inequality is generally supported by this third sample, the con¯dence with which we link income inequality and variation of real GDP growth is somewhat reduced.
We also attempted to extend our sample coverage by adding a third, earlier, time period. To do this, we needed to¯nd inequality observations over the time period 1956 to 1961 and output and consumption variability measures over the period 1960 to 1968.
We were able to¯nd such data for eight of the countries in our main 27-country sample.
Unfortunately, the eight countries that have data available during this earlier time period are predominately high-income countries. Therefore, this additional data may not help us to identify a relationship between income distribution and°uctuations that changes with per capita income. Nonetheless, the results from this exercise (available upon request), are slightly better than our third sample results discussed above. The coe±cients on all the income distribution variables in the consumption regressions retain the signs and signi¯cance reported for our main sample. However, in the GDP regressions, only the coe±cients in the regression using Q(5) as the inequality measure remain signi¯cant and of the correct sign.
We have several conclusions about the strength of our original results based on the sensitivity analysis we describe above. First, we¯nd our consumption results to be very strong. They are robust to changes in our sample, changes in our estimation technique, and changes in our sample selection strategy. Second, our overall conclusions about the link between GDP variability and inequality are fairly robust within the original sample, although a robust estimation technique replicates the signi¯cance levels of our initial results for only a subset of inequality measures. A new sample selection strategy does not allow us to generalize the GDP results, possibly due to structural change that occurs across the two time periods. Finally, the inequality measure that appears to have the strongest link with consumption and output variability is Q(5), the share of the top quintile. In the following section we brie°y examine one possible channel through which inequality could a®ect consumption and output variability that is consistent with thesē ndings.
Further Discussion
If the income distribution a®ects macroeconomic°uctuations because it determines the percent of the population that might be borrowing constrained, we would expect that nancial development would also be associated with less°uctuations. In fact, in our results above, M EAN GDP may be proxying for the level of¯nancial development.
To test this idea, we employ several measures of¯nancial development from King and Levine (1993) : LLY (M2 divided by GDP), BANK (ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money bank domestic assets plus central bank domestic assets), and P RIV Y (claims on non¯nancial private sector divided by GDP). 20 As discussed in King and Levine, each of these three measures capture a slightly di®erent aspect of¯nan-20 See King and Levine for details on the calculation of these measures. The underlying data is from IMF's IFS. King and Levine also construct a fourth measure of¯nancial development which they call P RIV AT E (ratio of claims on the non¯nancial private sector to total domestic credit). We do not use this measure due to lack of data availability for the majority of countries in our full sample. cial development. LLY and P RIV Y are two measures of the overall size of the¯nancial sector, while BANK is a slightly more sophisticated gauge, measuring the importance of private sector¯nancial institutions relative to the public sector. Higher levels of BAN K indicate that the private sector is more important, possibly indicating that there are less distortions in the decision to allocate credit. For our purposes, P RIV Y , the amount of credit provided to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, probably most closely resembles a measure that will indicate the extent to which the economy is in°uenced by borrowing constraints.
As a¯rst step, we checked to determine whether including a measure of¯nancial development alters our original conclusions about the relationship between inequality and variability. Although we do not report the details of our estimation, we found that it did not. Interestingly, the¯nancial development indicators often were insigni¯cant in these regressions and°ipped signs in the di®erent speci¯cations, suggesting that if any relationship exists between these measures and macroeconomic°uctuations, it is not captured by a linear coe±cient.
As mentioned above, it is also possible that in our original speci¯cation MEANGDP is proxying for¯nancial development. To test the validity of this idea, we include an interaction term between INCINEQ and the three di®erent measures of¯nancial development to see whether M EANGDP or F I NDEV is a better explanatory variable.
The results of this \horserace" appear in Tables 11a and 11b . In the consumption regressions, the coe±cients on LLY and P RIV Y are now signi¯cant and have the expected negative sign when each of the four inequality measures is used, while the coe±cient on BANK is negative and signi¯cant for only two of the four inequality measures. In the GDP regressions, LLY and P RIV Y again enter negatively and signi¯cantly in seven out of 8 speci¯cations while BANK is signi¯cant with the wrong sign in one out of four regressions. This indicates that the measures of overall¯nancial depth, LLY and P RIV Y seem to better explain macroeconomic°uctuations than the relative importance of private sector¯nancial institutions. We believe that these results are reasonable if the cause of more severe°uctuations is credit-constrained households.
The race between interaction terms is a bit too close to call. In several regressions, both interaction terms remain signi¯cant, although when we focus on the speci¯cations using only LLY or P RIV Y , the¯nancial development indicator wins by a nose. We interpret these results as suggesting that, while¯nancial development may play an important role in minimizing aggregate°uctuations, the level of per capita income still retains some explanatory power. Thus, other aspects of development not related to¯-nancial development may be important in the short-run macroeconomic performance of the economy. The coe±cients estimated in Tables 11a and 11b continue to imply that for the majority of the countries in our sample, higher levels of inequality are associated with lower variability in consumption and output. Consequently, only for the wealthiest and most¯nancially developed economies does greater equality lead to smaller aggregate°u ctuations. 21
[Tables 11.a and 11.b about here.]
Conclusion
We have documented a relationship between income inequality and variability in aggregate consumption growth. In low-income countries, higher levels of inequality are associated with less°uctuations in consumption growth, and in high-income countries, more inequality is associated with greater°uctuations. Some preliminary results indicate that¯nancial development may help to explain the relationship between inequality and aggregate consumption variability. While we have presented some results that suggest that variability in GDP growth is also related to income inequality in the same way, these results are not robust to alternative sample selection strategies and estimation techniques. Perhaps our failure to¯nd strong evidence that these°uctuations in aggregate consumption¯nd their way through to GDP°uctuations is indicative of the fact that, as suggested by the literature on economic growth and inequality, the supply side of the economy may be a®ected by the income distribution as well.
We do want to be cautious in making a welfare statement about these¯ndings.
Our attempt to link the household distribution of income to aggregate economic activity 21 We also performed a similar exercise to that discussed above, splitting our sample based on the sign of @V=@IN CIN EQ and reestimating (1) without any interaction terms. Our results were qualitatively similar to those reported earlier with the exception that, in one speci¯cation in our high income country sample, a statistically insigni¯cant coe±cient on GIN I displayed the incorrect sign.
highlights an important point{less aggregate°uctuations does not necessarily mean the majority of individuals in an economy are better o®{only those individuals who account for a substantial portion of aggregate consumption are.
